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Laying to Rest the Ecclesiastical
Presumption of Falsity: Why the Missouri
Approved Instructions Should Include
Falsity as an Element of Defamation
Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.'
"Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebeareramong thy people."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Calumny has been condemned at least since the time of Moses,3 with the
Romans expanding its punishment to include written defamation as far back as
the fifth century before the common era.4 Continually modified by kings,
ecclesiastical courts, state legislatures, and the United States Supreme Court, the
modem law of defamation is a thicket of presumptions, privileges, and plaintiffspecific pleadings. As the state's interest in protecting the reputation of citizens
is increasingly weighed against the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech,
the balance has tipped more and more in favor of protecting speech.
Government officials were the first to bear this shifting burden,5 and today even
private plaintiffs must prove a statement of public concern is false to recover
against a media defendant. 6
But the inroads of the United States Constitution into common law causes
of action are slow and muddy, leaving substantial potholes for state courts to fill.
The Missouri Supreme Court had the chance to fill one such pothole in Kenny
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,' by deciding whether truth is an affirmative defense to

1. 100 S.W.3d 809 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
2. Leviticus 19:16 (King James).
3. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour." Exodus 20:16 (King
James). "Thou shalt not raise a false report: put not thine hand with the wicked to be an
unrighteous witness." Id. at 23:1.
4. PETER F. CARTER-RUCK, LIBEL AND SLANDER 35 (1973). "At the time of the

Decemvirs (450 b.c.) we find that the offence of written defamation, known asfamosus
libellus, was actually punishable by death .... ." Id.
5. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) ("The
constitution[] ... prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made
with 'actual malice' .. ..").

6. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("[A] privatefigure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before
recovering damages for defamation from a media defendant.").
7. 100 S.W.3d 809 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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libel, as suggested by statute,8 or whether falsity is an element of the plaintiff s
prima facie case, as suggested by the United States Supreme Court. 9 Kenney
dodged the issue, however, reversing instead because the plaintiff had failed to
prove actual damage to her reputation as required under Nazeri v. Missouri
Valley College.'0 And yet the Nazeri court's requirement of proving actual
damages followed from that court's elimination of the distinction between per
se andperquod defamation, the same distinction that had historically determined
whether the falsity of the defendant's statement could be presumed. " Thus, even
though Kenney claimed to have left the question of proving falsity unresolved, 2
the court's decision in Nazeri may have provided the answer ten years earlier.
This Note explores the origins of the plaintiff s presumption of falsity and argues
that, after Nazeri, the burden of proving falsity must be borne by the plaintiff in
every case.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Lauren Kenney ("Lauren") was born on April 13, 1995,3 to Angela
Mueller 4 ("Angela") and Angela's then boyfriend Christopher Kenney
("Christopher"), the son of Plaintiff Carolyn Kenney ("Carolyn"). When the
couple separated, they obtained no court order determining custody or visitation;
however, both agreed that Lauren should live with Angela and that Christopher
should have regular biweekly visits." Usually, Christopher would ask his
mother Carolyn to drive Lauren from Angela's house to her own every other
weekend where Christopher would join them for his visitation."'
One ofChristopher's scheduled visits fell on Labor Day weekend of 1996. '
During the preceding week, he learned-or at least believed-that Angela was
planning to relocate herself and Lauren to Georgia. 8 On Friday, August 30,
Carolyn picked Lauren up from Angela's house in a white Honda Accord with

8. Mo. REv. STAT. § 509.090 (2000). "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affirmatively ... truth in defamation ... and any other matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense." Id.
9. See supra notes 5-6.
10. 860 S.W.2d 303, 313 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
11. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
12. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 814 n.2.
13. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. WD 59936, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS
1801, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 30,2002), rev'd, 100 S.W.3d 809 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
14. At the time their child was born, Angela's surname was Miles. Kenney, 100
S.W.3d at 811.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *4.
18. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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no visible license plates. 9 At the same time, Christopher filed a paternity action
in Clay County, Missouri, and scheduled a hearing for the following Tuesday,
September 3 to establish custody.2" On Saturday morning, Christopher and
Carolyn took Lauren to a friend's house at the Lake of the Ozarks where
Christopher called Angela to inform her of Tuesday's hearing and of his
intention to keep their daughter.2" He refused to tell Angela where Lauren was.22
On Sunday, September 1, Angela filed a missing person's report with the
Kansas City Police Department and posted approximately one hundred missing
child posters around the Kansas City Area.23 She placed one of these posters in
a Missing Children's Network display case at the Wal-Mart store in Lee's
Summit, Missouri.2" At the custody hearing, the judge awarded custody of
Lauren to Angela and Christopher surrendered the girl to Angela.25 The missing
child poster was not removed from the Lee's Summit Wal-Mart for several days,
however, despite the fact that three people on four separate occasions informed
the store's management that the poster was inaccurate.26
Just under two years27 later, Carolyn filed a petition for defamation against
Wal-Mart in Jackson County, Missouri, for failing to remove the poster from
its Lee's Summit store after Lauren was returned to her mother.29 The case was
tried before a jury who awarded Carolyn $33,750 in actual damages and

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at *4-5.
22. Id. at *5.
23. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
The poster showed a picture of Lauren with Carolyn and read as follows: "Last seen 1:30
p.m. on 8/30/96 leaving her home with paternal grandmother, Carolyn Kenney, in a 1996
or 1997 white Honda Accord, no visible license plate, now with father Christopher
Kenney, and grandmother at unknown location." Id. Angela also contacted a local
television station which broadcast a missing child report identifying Lauren as in the
custody of Carolyn and Christopher Kenney. Id.; see also Kenney v. Scripps Howard
Broad. Co., 259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001) (in which Carolyn sued the television station
for libel).
24. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 811.
25. Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *7.
26. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 812.
27. The statute of limitations for defamation claims in Missouri is two years. Mo.
REv. STAT. § 516.140 (2000).
28. She had also previously sued KSHB-TV, the television station that aired the
missing child report. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 812 n.1. Carolyn lost her first suit on
summary judgment due to the fair report privilege. Id.; see Kenney v. Scripps Howard
Broad. Co., 259 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2001).
29. Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *7-8.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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$392,083 in punitive damages."a Wal-Mart appealed on eight grounds, 3' onlythe
last of which gave the court of appeals pause: the Missouri Approved Jury
Instruction 23.06(1), upon which the court modeled its verdict director,
contradicted the Missouri Supreme Court's holding in Overcast v. Billings
Mutual Insurance Co. 2 by omitting the element of falsity from the prima facie
claim and instead treating truth as an affirmative defense.33 After noting that
Wal-Mart had not preserved the issue for appeal,34 the court of appeals
nevertheless held that such a contradiction constituted plain error" because it
' In view of conflicting
resulted in "a miscarriage ofjustice to the appellant."36
37
precedents and MAI instructions, the court of appeals not only reversed and
remanded, but transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court under Rule
83.0238 because it believed that "this case presents questions of general interest

30. Id. at *9. Wal-Mart's prior motions for directed verdict, as well as its
subsequent motions for J.N.O.V. or a new trial in the alternative, were all overruled. Id.
at *8-9.
31. Wal-Mart's first seven claims of error alleged that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that the poster's statements were defamatory in nature, that WalMart intentionally published or negligently published the poster, and that the publication
damaged Carolyn; that Wal-Mart had not proven the poster was substantially true; that
the poster was privileged under the fair report doctrine; and that punitive damages were
inappropriate absent a showing of actual malice. Id. at *2.
32. 11 S.W.3d 62, 70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc). "The elements of defamation in
Missouri are: 1) publication, 2) of a defamatory statement, 3) that identifies the plaintiff,
4) that isfalse, 5) that is published with the requisite degree of fault, and 6) damages the
plaintiff's reputation." Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *17 (emphasis
added) (citing Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coil., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
33. Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *21.
34. Id. at *22-23.
35. Id. at *24. "[T]he law is well settled that in cases of such conflict, the law is
to prevail over the applicable MAI instruction.... [T]he law is the dog and the MAI is
the tail, and the latter cannot wag the former, such that the applicable MAI instruction
must reflect the existing law, not vice versa." Id. at *19.
36. Id. at *35. "[H]ad the jury been properly instructed, with the burden being
placed on the respondent to show that the alleged defamatory statements in the poster
were false, the outcome of this case may very well have been different." Id. at *34.
37. Compare Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 313 (comporting with the five element proof
of defamation in MAI 23.06(1) in which falsity is not an element), with Overcast, 11
S.W.3d at 70 (enumerating six elements of defamation, including falsity, citing Nazeri
without specific page reference).
38. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 83.02:

A case disposed of by an opinion, memorandum decision, written order, or
order of dismissal in the court of appeals may be transferred to this Court by
order of a majority of the participating judges, regular and special, on their
own motion or on application of a party. Transfer may be ordered because of
the general interest or importance of a question involved in the case or for the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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and importance and the existing law of defamation needs re-examining." '
This request was not honored by the supreme court, which relegated the
issue of truth or falsity to a footnote, 40 and instead focused its inquiry on the
element of damage. The court held that the trial court's verdict director
impermissibly modified MAI 23.06(1) by removing the requirement of actual
damage to reputation.' In so holding, the court relied on its earlier decision in
Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, which abandoned the distinction betweenper
se and per quod defamation such that plaintiffs need no longer "'concern
themselves with whether the defamation was per se ....but must prove actual
damages in all cases."'42 The court remanded, noting that although Carolyn
"may face substantial obstacles in meeting her burden of proof on retrial, this
Court cannot say that it is impossible for her to present a submissible case." 3
The court left unanswered the question of whether her burden of proof included
the falsity of the poster.
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. From ManorialCourts to Missouri Courts:
Defamation at Common Law
The early Anglo-Saxon common law of defamation was concerned only

with slander, an offense for which the guilty speaker could choose his tongue or
his life." After the Norman invasion, slander cases were triaged into different
courts depending on the person disparaged and the resulting injury.45 Slander

purpose of reexamining existing law.
39. Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *42.

40. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 814 n.2 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc).
Wal-Mart also raised whether "truth" is an affirmative defense to be proved
by defendant, or "falsity" is an element of the cause of action to be proved by

plaintiff. Language in our recent cases ...
suggest[s] different answers to this
issue ....
This Court does not address the issue here and leaves it unresolved.
Id.
41. Id. at 814. The trial court modified MAI 23.06(1) in its verdict director by
changing the approved language of "'Fifth, the plaintiff's reputation was thereby
damaged,"' to "'Fifth, the poster directly caused or directly contributed to cause damage
to Plaintiff."' Id. at 813.
42. Id. at 815 (quoting Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 313).
43. Id. at 818.
44. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 4, at 36.
45. Id. at 37. After the Norman invasion of England, there were three types of
courts in the country: the king's courts, the manorial courts (those presided over by local
barons), and the ecclesiastical courts. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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against one's lord or king became a criminal offense to be tried in the king's
courts.46 Those of less than noble birth could also maintain an action for slander
in their local manorial courts but only if the slander were accompanied by an
assault or the destruction of property.4 7
As the manorial courts began to decay, the ecclesiastical courts expanded
theirjurisdiction to include slander as a sin and sentenced the guilty to penance.4 8
By the sixteenth century, the king's courts had also begun to hear tort actions for
slander which led to many jurisdictional conflicts; in order to limit the number
of defamation cases in the royal courts, the king's bench eventually held that
absent "temporal" damage, slander caused only "spiritual" harm and belonged
in the purview of the church.49 When the ecclesiastical courts were eventually
dismantled, the royal courts absorbed only those "spiritual" assaults for which
a concomitant temporal injury could be presumed, i.e. slanders imputing a
serious crime, a "loathsome" disease, a lack of chastity (only actionable by
women), or a lack of professional integrity or ability.5" These imported slanders
were actionable per se, while all others were actionable per quod and required
proof of special damages. 5
Although there are a few references to libel in early English common law,52
the cause of action was not widely tried before the advent of the printing press
in the fifteenth century when the infamous Star Chamber Court began to punish
seditious political publications under the law of libel.53 Since the Chamber also
punished the sending of disparaging letters meant to incite duels, 4 it began to
award private tort damages for libelous personal attacks as a means of
discouraging self-help.55 When the Star Chamber was abolished, the royal courts
swept both the criminal and civil law of libel within their jurisdiction.56
As they had with slander, the royal courts divided actions for libel into per
se and per quod categories, though the distinction was different than that used
for slander and carried different consequences: to be libelous per se, the
defamatory nature of the written publication must have been self-evident,
whereas libelsper quod required resort to extrinsic facts." While this distinction

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38.
William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 841 (1960).
Id.
Id.
Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
See CARTER-RUCK, supra note 4, at 36.
Prosser, supra note 48.
54. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 4, at 39.
55. Prosser, supra note 48.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 839-40. For example, a newspaper article reporting that a woman had
been carrying on an extramarital affair would be actionable per se. Id. By contrast, an
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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determined whether a plaintiff had to prove that the publication was defamatory,
it had no effect on damages: at common law (and in modem English law), all
libel was presumed to cause damage.58
The presumption of damage in all libel actions continued into the American
common law until 1877 when the Nebraska Supreme Court59 first required proof
of actual damage for libel unless the words were actionableperse. ° Other states
followed Nebraska's lead, and by the mid twentieth century most states, arguably
including Missouri, 6' required the plaintiff to plead and to prove actual damages
for libel per quod.62 Thus, the American common law of defamation has
memorialized "the ancient conflict of jurisdiction between the royal and
'
ecclesiastical courts of England"63
by expanding the ecclesiastical presumption
of damage into both slander and libel per se while requiring proof of actual
damage for slander and libel per quod."
B. Other EcclesiasticalEchoes in the Law of Defamation:
The Presumption of Falsity
When the Missouri Supreme Court eventually abolished theperse/per quod
distinction in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, the court noted that "[t]he
consequences of [the ecclesiastical] anachronism were of more than academic
interest. The presumed damages/special damages distinction controlled the right
of plaintiffs to bring a defamation claim, even though it bore little relationship
to either the magnitude of a plaintiff's injury or the wrongfulness of a

article reporting that a woman had given birth, combined with the reader's knowledge
that she was unmarried, would be libel per quod. Id. at 840.
58. Id. at 842. That all libels presumed damages but most slanders did not is
probably a function of "the undue reverence of an illiterate nation for the written or
printed word, which might well be expected to make libel more damaging." Id.
59. See Geisler v. Brown, 6 Neb. 254, 259 (1877):
[N]ot every false charge against an individual ... is sufficient to sustain an
action for damages. In order to authorize a recovery the plaintiff must aver
in his petition, and prove on the trial, that he has sustained some special
damages from the publication of the alleged libel, unless the nature of the
charge is such that the words are actionable per se.
60. Prosser, supra note 48, at 843-44.
61. Missouri arguably adopted this new rule in Creekmore v. Runnels, 224 S.W.2d
1007 (Mo. 1949). Prosser, supra note 48, at 846 n.47.
62. See Prosser, supra note 48, at 844-48 nn.21-62. Some have argued that this
change in the common law rule was the result of systemic misunderstanding of the
distinctions between slander and libel, but Prosser argues that the "American" rule is
more logical since a libel per quod is incomplete without proof of extrinsic facts that,
when combined with the libelous text, result in damage to the plaintiff. Id. at 848-49.
63. Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
64. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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'
defendant's conduct."65
The presumption of damage, however, was but one
factor controlling the plaintiffs defamation claim. Of equal import was the
concomitant presumption of falsity.
At common law, there were three elements of defamation: (1) a defamatory
statement, (2) referring to the plaintiff, and (3) published to a third person."' As
these were the only elements of the plaintiff s prima facie case, "it follows that
certain presumptions [were] made" in the plaintiffs favor.67 First, "it [was]
presumed in all actions for defamation that the matter complained of [was]
untrue .... 6 Secondly, as discussed above, it was also presumed in all actions
for libel and in all actions for slanderper se that the plaintiff suffered damage.69
The latter was a vestige of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but whence did the
presumption of falsity arise?
Historically, no court required a plaintiff to prove that her reputation was
good before hearing an action for defamation; however, all courts have allowed
the defendant an affirmative defense of truth.7" Since proving the truth of the
defamatory statement would not undo the damage to the plaintiff s reputation,7
the basis for this affirmative defense must be other than rebutting the
presumption of damage. The explanation lies in the fact that the ecclesiastical
courts viewed the injury to one's reputation as spiritual damage. Impugning the
plaintiff s character caused her psychic damage because it damaged her good
name. 3 But such damage presupposes the good character of the plaintiff. If the
defendant's statements were true, then his words would merely reflect the
plaintiff s preexisting spiritual damage; they would not be the cause of any new

65. Id.
66. CARTER-RUCK, supranote 4, at 50; cf Mo. APPROVED INSTR. Nos. 23.06,23.09
(1969).
67. CARTER-RUCK, supra note 4, at 50.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 105-06.
71. As William Murray, the chief justice of the king's bench in 1784, once
observed, "The greater the truth, the greater the libel." DAVID S. SHRAGER & ELIZABETH
FROST, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 307 (1986).

72. See supranotes 49-50 and accompanying text.
73. Psychic damage was not simply ajudicial fiction but a matter of cultural belief,
as explained by Shakespeare's lago:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
'Twas mine, 'tis
his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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damage. Even though a secretly wicked plaintiff's reputation might be damaged
by a truthful defamatory statement, her soul would have been damaged already
and could not be harmed further by revealing the truth of her character. Thus,
in the view of the ecclesiastical courts, rebutting the presumption of falsity also
rebutted the presumption of spiritual, if not reputational, damage.
Although the presumption of falsity followed the rest of English common
law across the ocean, American courts have altered the presumption over time
and limited its application to cases of per se defamation. In Walker v. Kansas
City Star Co.,"' the Missouri Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff
defamed by accusations of sedition, conspiracy, and assault upon federal
officers75 was required to plead that the accusations were false. In that case the
Kansas City Star had published several articles about rioting in Oxford,
Mississippi, following the enrollment of an African-American student at the
University of Mississippi."6 Throughout its articles and headlines, the paper
named former Major General Edwin Walker as the leader of one of the student
charges against federal marshals guarding the door of the dormitory." Walker
sued the paper for libel but his action was dismissed for failure to state a claim,
namely that he had failed to allege that the articles were false.78 The supreme
court reversed the dismissal and remanded for trial, holding that the "plaintiff
need not plead falsity in a case of libel per se where he is not required to prove
falsity."79
The Walker court found that "'[t]he essential facts [of libel] are the falsity
of the charge, and its publication and libelous nature,'" and noted several prior
cases that had been dismissed for failure to allege falsity.8 However, the court
also observed that averments of falsity were not required in all cases:
In some cases, [like one] dealing with whether plaintiff owed a certain
sum of money as stated by defendant, there is no cause of action unless
the statement is alleged to be false. On the other hand, there arecases
in which falsity need not be alleged, e.g..., where the words are
actionableper se ...."'

74. 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966).
75. Id. at 52.
76. Id. at 46.
77. Id. at 47.
78. Id. at 50.
79. Id. at 53.
80. Id. at 52 (quoting McDonald v. R. L. Polk & Co., 142 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Mo.
1940)).
81. See Holliday v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 256 F.2d 297, 302 (8th Cir. 1958);
Fritschle v. Kettle River Co., 139 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Mo. 1940).
82. Walker, 406 S.W.2d at 52 (emphasis added).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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Under Walker, falsity is not an element of libel per se because the words are
actionable by themselves, given the plaintiff's presumptively good reputation.
By contrast, libelper quod requires that the plaintiff allege falsity because "there
is no cause of action unless the statement is alleged to be false." 83 Although the
court did not unearth the origins of the per se and per quod distinction, its
holding reflects the same "ancient conflict ofjurisdiction between the royal and
ecclesiastical courts"84 that led to a presumption of damage in cases of
defamation per se.
C. The FirstAmendment and the Presumptionsof Damage and Falsity
The extension of ecclesiastical presumptions from slander to libel is not the
only alteration American courts have made to the common law of defamation.
Of far greater impact are the United States Supreme Court decisions in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan85 and its progeny, reexamining the torts of libel and slander
in view of the First Amendment. One consequence of these decisions, although
not the main one, has been the gradual erosion of the ecclesiastical presumptions
of damage and falsity in per se defamation suits.
In Sullivan, the Supreme Court first imposed the guarantees of free speech
and press on cases involving libel of "public officials" by requiring such
plaintiffs to prove that the defendant's speech was motivated by "actual
malice."8 6 A decade later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 7 the Court extended
similar protection to those who allegedly defamed private figures by requiring
even private plaintiffs to prove actual malice in order to sustain presumed or
punitive damages.8 8 In the absence of actual malice, private plaintiffs were
required to prove-and could only recover for-actual injury. 9 In short, Gertz

seemed to eliminate the ecclesiastical presumption of damage by requiring
plaintiffs in all cases, whetherper se orper quod, to prove either actual malice
or actual damages. The Gertz Court noted that "'[t]he largely uncontrolled
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily...
inhibit[s] the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.... States have
no substantial interest [in granting] gratuitous awards of money damages far in
excess of any actual injury."""

83. Id.
84. See supra note 63.
85. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
86. Id. at 279-80. The requisite proof was a showing that the defendant knew its
statements were false or acted with reckless disregard as to whether the statements were
true or false. Id. at 280.
87. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
88. Id. at 349.
89. Id.

90. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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Given Gertz's attack on the presumption of damage, several states, 9'
including Missouri, 92 interpreted the Court's holding as abrogating the perse/per
quod distinction.9 However, the Court clarified its Gertz holding a decade later
by limiting the "actual
malice" requirement for private plaintiffs to matters of
"public concern. ' 94 Missouri courts, like those of other states, were left to
ponder whether they should reinstate the common law distinction (and the
concomitant presumption of damage) they had abandoned after Gertz. In Nazeri
v. Missouri Valley College,95 the Missouri Supreme Court found the per se/per
quod distinction "more artificial than real," and held "plaintiffs need not concern
themselves with whether the defamation was per se or per quod, nor with
whether special damages exist, but must prove actual damages in all cases." 96
If there had been any doubt after Gertz, the Nazeri court made clear that the
ecclesiastical presumption of damage was abolished in Missouri.
The effect of the First Amendment on the presumption of falsity is less
clear. In the aftermath of Sullivan and its progeny, Missouri's Model Approved
Jury Instructions ("MAI") distinguished between classes of plaintiffs: MAI
23.06(1) covers private plaintiffs while MAI 23.06(2) covers plaintiffs who are
public officials or public figures.97 The two instructions are similar except that
the public plaintiff instruction requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard

91. E.g., Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412,419 (Tenn. 1978) ("We
hold, therefore, that the Per se/per quod distinction is no longer a viable one."); accord
Gobin v. Globe Publ'g Co., 649 P.2d 1239 (Kan. 1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. Hillman,
400 A.2d 1117 (Md. 1979); Agriss v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 483 A.2d 456 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984); Lent v. Huntoon, 470 A.2d 1162 (Vt. 1983).
92. In 1980, Missouri changed its approved jury instructions (MAI), eliminating
separate instructions for libel and slander per se and per quod. Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at
310.
93. Id. at 309-10.
94. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985).
"In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public
concern, we hold that the state interest [in protecting the reputation of its citizens]

adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing
of 'actual malice."' Id.
95. 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
96. Id. at 312-13.
97. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 23.06(l)-(2) (2002).
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'
for truth where the private plaintiff instruction requires only "fault."99
Further,
the instruction for public plaintiffs adds falsity itself as a separate element.' 00
The Committee Comment (1990 Revision) to the public plaintiff instruction
explained that these two differences "reflect the actual malice requirement of
[Sullivan].'"' The third element-knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
truth-is obviously the result of Sullivan. 02 However, including falsity as a
separate element of the plaintiff's prima facie claim requires more explanation
since it was not until six years after MA 23.06(2) was amended that the United
States Supreme Court first laid the burden of falsity explicitly on any class of
plaintiffs in PhiladelpiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps.' 3
As in the ecclesiastical courts of England, the American defamation
plaintiff was traditionally "given the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the
statement was false.""' Truth was therefore an affirmative defense at common
law' °5 and was codified as such in the Missouri Constitution, 6 statute, 10 7 court

98. The third element requires,
defendant (describe the act ofpublication such as 'publishedsuch statement
'wrote such letter, etc.) either:
with knowledge that it was false, or
with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false at a time when
defendant had serious doubt as to whether it was true ....
Id. at 23.06(2).
99. The second element requires, "defendant was at fault in publishing such
statement. ..." Id. at 23.06(1). The Committee Comment (1980 New) to MAI 23.06(1)
notes that in Gertz, "the Court held that so long as the states do not impose liability
without fault, they may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for
defamation to a private individual." Id. at 23.06(1), Comm. Comment.
100. Id. at 23.06(2). "Second, such statement was false ....
" Id.
101. Id. at 23.06(2), Comm. Comment.
102. See supra note 86.
103. 475 U.S. 767 (1986); see Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490
(1975) ("The Court has ...left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require that truth be recognized as a defense in a defamation action brought
by a private person as distinguished from a public official or public figure.").
104. Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer,61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1353 (1975).
105. Id. at 1353 n.16.
106. MO. CONST. art. I, § 8. "[I]n all suits and prosecutions for libel or slander the
truth thereof may be given in evidence." Id. Arguably, this clause may allow truth to
function as a failure of proof defense as well as an affirmative defense.
107. Mo. REv. STAT. § 509.090 (2000). "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively... truth in defamation ...and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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rule, ° and model jury instructions.' 9 Nevertheless, there is language in
Sullivan"10 and subsequent cases. that seemed to shift the burden of falsity onto
at least public plaintiffs. Indeed, several courts" 2 as well as the Conunittee
Comment' 3to MA 23.06(2) read it as doing precisely that. Some courts even
required a public plaintiff to prove falsity by clear and convincing evidence.'
Other courts disagreed and continued to follow the common law rule." 5 It was
not until Hepps that the United States Supreme Court clarified the holding of
Sullivan vis-i-vis the plaintiff's burden of proof for falsity:
Because the burden of proof is the deciding factor only when the
evidence is ambiguous, we cannot know how much of the speech
affected by the allocation of the burden of proof is true and how much

108. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 55.08. "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set

forth all applicable affirmative defenses and avoidances, including but not limited to
... truth in defamation... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense." Id.
109. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No. 32.12 (2002). "Your verdict must be for defendant
if you believe that the statement... was substantially true." Id.
110. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964):
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of
all his factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually
unlimited in amount-leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance
of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does
not mean that only false speech will be deterred ....
Under such a rule,
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense
of having to do so.... The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety
of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
111. See Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8 (1970)
("[Sullivan] held that the Constitution permits a 'public official' to recover money
damages for libel only if he can show that the defamatory publication was not onlyfalse
but was uttered with 'actual malice' .. . .") (emphasis added); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("We held in [Sullivan] that a public official might be allowed the
civil remedy only if he establishes thatthe utterancewasfalse and that it was made with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.")
(emphasis added).
112. See Field Research Corp. v. Patrick, 106 Cal. Rptr. 473, 478 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973) ("In a First Amendment case, plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity.")
(quotation marks omitted); see also Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir.
1969); Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 253 N.E.2d 408,412 (111.1969); Reaves v. Foster, 200
So. 2d 453, 458 (Miss. 1967).
113. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. Eaton, supra note 104, at 1385.
115. See Corabi v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 273 A.2d 899, 908 (Pa. 1971).
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is false.... [W]here the scales are in such an uncertain balance, we
believe that the Constitution requires us to tip them in favor of
protecting true speech. To ensure that true speech on matters of public
concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption
that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks
6
damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern.'
Before Hepps, the Court had never explicitly dealt with the presumption of
falsity-even for public plaintiffs-though it has often claimed to have laid the
burden of proving falsity on public plaintiffs in Sullivan."7 Hepps clarified
whatever ambiguity Sullivan may have created by explicitly shifting the burden
of proof for falsity onto the plaintiff: "We believe that the common law's rule
on falsity-that the defendant must bear the burden of proving truth-must
similarly fall here to a constitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the
burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before recovering damages.""''s
There is no longer any doubt that the First Amendment requires a private
plaintiff to prove falsity against a media defendant that publishes matters of
public concern.' "' Yet the holding in Hepps was narrow. As Justice Brennan
pointed out in his concurring opinion, the Court did not say whether its holding
applied to non-media defendants. 20 Furthermore, the holding does not
distinguish between private and public figures, though it clearly applies to the
former since the plaintiff in Hepps was a private figure. 2 ' It stands to reason, a
fortiori, that public figures would have at least as great a burden as private
figures under the actual malice requirement. Thus, some have argued that after
Hepps, "the common law presumption of falsity must fail and the plaintiff, public
or private, in a defamation action must plead and prove falsity as an element of
his prima facie case."' 22
Even before the Court handed down its decision, the Hepps rule had been
anticipated and applied even more broadly by many lower federal courts and
state supreme courts. The Sixth Circuit had placed the burden of showing falsity

116. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986).
117. Id. at 775. "Our opinions to date have chiefly treated the necessary showings
of fault rather than of falsity. Nonetheless, as one might expect given the language of the
Court in [Sullivan], a public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statements at
issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation." Id.
118. Id. at 776.
119. Id. at 777.
120. Id. at 780 (Brennan, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 776. "Here, as in Gertz, the plaintiff is a private figure and the
newspaper articles are of public concern." Id.
122. Thomas W. Cushing et al., Comment, Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers Inc.:
The Validity of the Common Law Presumption ofFalsity in Light of New York Times
and Its Progeny, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 125,140 (1986).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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on private plaintiffs five years before Hepps. "3 The Virginia Supreme Court had
held a year before Hepps that truth could no longer be an affirmative defense
against a private plaintiff because a plaintiff had to prove falsity before he could
prove negligence or reckless disregard with respect to falsity. 24 With regard to
public plaintiffs, most courts had shifted the burden of falsity onto the plaintiff
even earlier as part of the actual malice requirement of Sullivan. 2 '
By contrast, the distinction in Missouri's Approved Jury Instructions that
determines whether falsity is an element or truth an affirmative defense depends
on whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure.26 rather than on whether the
defendant is a news medium." 7 Further complicating the matter is Overcast v.
Billings Mutual Insurance Co.,' a case between a privateplaintiffand a nonmedia defendant in which the Missouri Supreme Court enumerated six elements
of defamation, including falsity.' 29 Thus, the MAI govemingpublicplaintiffso
actually comports with the Missouri Supreme Court's elements ofdefamation for
privateplaintiffs, while the MAI govemingprivateplaintiffs"'does not include
falsity as an element, contradicting both Overcast and Hepps.
Add to this confusion the Missouri Constitution, statute, court rule, and
MAI 32 listing truth in defamation as an affirmative defense, and one can see why
the Western District of the Court of Appeals thought "the existing law of
defamation needs re-examining."' 3 a One thing is clear, however; the United

123. See Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1981).
[The] common law allocation of the burden of proof is drawn into
question by the constitutional prohibition against liability without fault
established in Gertz. The language [in Sullivan] and later cases makes clear
that the burden of demonstrating the falsity of the defamatory statement rests
on the plaintiff when the [actual] malice standard applies.
Id. at 374-75 (citations omitted).
124. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 724-25 (Va. 1985).
125. See supra notes 110-12.
126. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
127. Whether this distinction has any relevance is unresolved; however, there is
some indication that it is irrelevant. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
780 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that distinguishing between
classes of defendants was 'irreconcilable with the fundamental First Amendment
principle that "[the] inherent worth of... speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of the source, whether corporation,
association, union, or individual ....
Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
128. 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
129. See supra note 32.
130. Mo. APPROVED INSTR. No.23.06(2) (2002).
131. Id. at 23.06(1).
132. See supra notes 106-09.
133. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. WD 59936, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS
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States Supreme Court's First Amendment cases have severely curtailed the
ecclesiastical presumptions of damage and falsity.'34 Missouri took the step of
abolishing the presumption of damage altogether in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley
College. Ten years later, Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., presented an

opportunity for the court to take the further step of abolishing the presumption
of falsity.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Missouri Supreme Court received transfer of Kenney v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., in order to "re-examine" Missouri defamation law, specifically
whether falsity was an element or truth an affirmative defense. 3 Instead, the
court chose to focus its inquiry on whether the plaintiff had to prove actual
damage to reputation.136 Writing for a unanimous six judge court,'37 Judge Price
reaffirmed the ruling of Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College," holding that "[t]he

trial court's instruction misdirected the jury and allowed recovery of 'parasitic'
damages without finding injury to reputation." 39
Although Wal-Mart raised nine points of error this time, the supreme court
limited its analysis to only two issues: the verdict director given to the jury and
the proof of actual damages. 40 The court first noted that "[a]ny deviation from
an approved MAI instruction is presumed prejudicial error unless the contrary
is shown."14' The Model Approved Instruction for libel of a private figure, MAI
23.06(1), includes "Fifth, the plaintiffs reputation was thereby damaged."' 42
However, as the court pointed out, the instruction in Kenney had read, "Fifth, the
poster directly caused or directly contributed to cause damage to Plaintiff."' 4 3
The court also observed that Carolyn's attorney had focused his closing
argument on her emotional suffering rather than on any harm to her reputation.'"

1801, at *42 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 30,2002), rev'd, 100 S.W.3d 809 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
134. See supra notes 110-12.

135. Kenney, 2002 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *42. The transfer was pursuant
to Missouri Supreme Court Rule 83.02. Id.
136. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
137. Judge Benton did not participate in the judgment. Id. at 818.

138.
139.
140.
141.

860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 814.

Id. at 813.
Id.

142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. (emphasis added).

144. Id. Counsel closed by saying, "You saw my client on the witness stand in
describing how it felt to know that four to six thousand people a day were looking at that
poster, and you could see how she was on that witness stand. Does anyone doubt that
that at least contributed to cause damage to her?" Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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Next the court noted that Missouri and other states "have adopted rules
requiring a plaintiff to prove reputational harm before allowing recovery for
other related injuries, such as emotional distress."' 45 The court also recognized
that defamation law had traditionally required damage to reputation as a
prerequisite to emotional damage.'4 6 Finding that the jury instruction
impermissibly modified the MAI to remove the element of damage to reputation,
and further that counsel's closing argument had focused solely on mental
anguish without addressing reputational harm, the court concluded that the
judgment on the verdict demanded reversal. 4
Continuing its discussion of actual damages, the court first cited Nazeri for
its abrogation of theper se/per quod distinction. 48 Historically, the court noted,
a plaintiff accused of a criminal act, a loathsome disease, or an inability to
perform his profession had been slandered per se and was not required to prove
actual harm because the ecclesiastical courts had presumed spiritual damage
from such allegations.'4 9 All other accusations, deemed slanderper quod, were
historically tried in the royal courts and required proof of special damages, i.e.
some pecuniary loss.' The court listed several examples of "special damages"
including the "loss of a marriage, of employment, of income, of profits, and even
of gratuitous entertainment and hospitality;"'' special damages did not include
"mere annoyance or loss of peace of mind, nor even physical illness."' Only
after a court deemed a defamatory statement actionable, either per se or upon
proof of pecuniary damage, could the plaintiff recover for other "parasitic"
damages.'
Finding these Byzantine rules as unappealing as the Nazeri court
had, the court reaffirmed the rule of Nazeri which eliminated the ecclesiastical
courts' presumption of damage
and required a plaintiff to prove actual
54
reputational harm in all cases.
Next the court turned to what might constitute actual damages by looking
to other cases in Missouri, in the Eighth Circuit, and in other states. In Bauer v.
Ribaudo,' the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals had upheld
summary judgment in favor of a defendant politician who had run a television

145. Id.
146. Id. (citing DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §400, at 1117 (2001); WILLAM
L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971)).
147. Id. at 814.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 814-15.
152. Id. at 815.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. 975 S.W.2d 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 5
MISSOURI LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 69

advertisement insinuating that his political opponent was a criminal. 5 6 Although
such an accusation was once considered libel per se, the Bauer Court rejected
plaintiff's case because he had not produced any evidence from polls or
individual voters that his reputation had been harmed."5 7
The court then looked to how the Eighth Circuit applied Missouri law."
In Authaud v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 9 the Eighth Circuit held that
"[s]ince Nazeri.... Missouri courts require a showing of actual damages in all
defamation cases. To demonstrate actual damages, plaintiffs must show that
defamatory statements caused a quantifiable professional or personal injury, such
as interference with job performance, psychological or emotional distress, or
depression."' 60
Applying these standards, the Kenney court found Carolyn's evidence of
actual reputational harm "tenuous at best."'' The court noted that Carolyn had
"made only a conclusory statement that her reputation was injured and that she
felt 'embarrassed, shocked, mad' because of the poster."'" 2 Like the plaintiff in
Bauer, she had not introduced any concrete evidence that her reputation had
suffered; indeed her sole witness was a long time friend who testified that her
estimation of Carolyn had not been affected by the poster.'63 The court further
noted that there was almost no evidence of physical or emotional damage."6

156. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 815.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 816 (citations omitted).
159. 170 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 1999).
160. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 816 (citation omitted). The court also surveyed other
states. New Jersey required
"[S]ome concrete proof that [the plaintiff s] reputation has been injured. One
form of proof is that an existing relationship has been seriously disrupted
....
Testimony of third parties as to a diminished reputation will also suffice
to prove "actual injury." Awards based on a plaintiff's testimony alone or
"inferred"damages are unacceptable."
Id. (quoting Rocci v. MacDonald-Cartier, 731 A.2d 1205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999)). Tennessee would not award damages for injury unless it "'rose above
embarrassment stemming from individual encounters."' Id. at 816-17 (quoting Murray
v. Lineberry, 69 S.W.3d 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). Finally Hawaii found no actual
harm absent lost income, some expense to mitigate or correct the defamation, or
testimony by another of some concrete change in the other's estimation of the plaintiff.
Id. at 817 (citing Jenkins v. Liberty Newspapers Ltd. P'ship, 971 P.2d 1089 (Haw.
1999)).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. For example, Carolyn had no medical records, no records of psychiatric or
other psychological treatment, no sleeplessness or any other symptoms of mental distress.
Id. at 817-18.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/5
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Finally, the court looked to causation and found nothing to distinguish the WalMart poster from the other ninety-nine posters Angela had posted around Kansas
City or the broadcast on KSHB-TV which had already been deemed privileged
by the Eighth Circuit. 65 In short, proof of actual damages to Carolyn's
reputation was extremely weak; however, the court could not say conclusively
that she could not make out a submissible case at retrial. 6' The court therefore
reversed and remanded for a new trial without answering the question of which
party bears the burden of proving truth or falsity in Missouri defamation cases.
V. COMMENT
In a footnote to its decision, the Kenney court noted that Wal-Mart had
raised the issue ofwhether truth was an affirmative defense or falsity an element,
1 67
the very issue for which the court of appeals had transferred the case.
Recognizing a conflict between its recent decisions 68 and MAI 23.06(1), the
court also observed that the falsity issue "has constitutional dimensions,"1 69 and
that it should "avoid the decision of a constitutional question if the case [could]
be fully determined without reaching it."' 0 But the case was never "fully
determined" because the court reversed on other grounds without declaring
which party should bear the burden of proving truth or falsity on retrial. In
remanding without resolving this issue, the supreme court left the lower court
with no guidance.
After Hepps, Missouri and every other state must include falsity among the
elements of a private plaintiffs prima facie case, at least when suing a media
defendant for speech of public concern.'
But the limited mandate of Hepps
does not resolve Kenney or other cases against non-media defendants, 7 nor

165. Id. at 818; see also supra note 23.
166. Kenney, 100 S.W.3d at 818. "Though [Carolyn] may face substantial
obstacles in meeting her burden of proof on retrial, this Court cannot say that it is
impossible for her to present a submissible case." Id.
167. Id. at 814 n.2.
168. Id. (citing Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2000) (en
banc); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
169. Id. (citing Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)).
170. Id. (citing Union Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 687 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo.
1985)).
171. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776-77.
172. Neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the Western District of the Court of
Appeals directly addressed the issue of whether the Missing Children's Network display
case rendered Wal-Mart a "media defendant." The argument could be made that the
publishing of the poster was analogous to KSHB-TV's broadcast of an official missing
person report and that Wal-Mart was serving a media function by publishing information
purely of public concern.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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cases involving speech on private matters. Overcast v. Billings Mutual
InsuranceCo. might require falsity to be pleaded and proved by all plaintiffs in
all cases, but Overcast incorrectly cited Nazeri for this proposition and no such
enumeration of elements appears anywhere in the Nazeri opinion.' 73 So the
question remains, what burden of proof must Carolyn Kenney carry on remand?
Ironically, the Missouri Supreme Court's decision to abandon the per se/per
quod distinction in Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College provides the answer to this
question as well.
As the court noted in Nazeri, the per se/per quod distinction was a relic of
the jurisdictional conflicts between ecclesiastical and royal courts. 74 Slanderper
se was originally the province of the ecclesiastical courts because the injury was
"spiritual" in nature.'
The ecclesiastical courts presumed both that the
defamatory statement caused damage and that it was false; neither procedural
advantage was afforded to plaintiffs in the royal courts where all slander wasper
quod. Although the ecclesiastical courts were eventually swept away, their
presumptions outlived theirjurisdiction in the distinction betweenper se andper
76
quod defamation, a distinction "entrenched in the very definition of the tort.'
When Nazeri eliminated the per se/per quod distinction in favor of a
universal damage requirement, in essence it eliminated defamation per se since

173. If Overcast changed the law, it did so without explanation and perhaps
without necessity, as Judge Ellis of the Western District of the Court of Appeals noted
in his partial dissent to Kenney. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. WD 59936, 2002
Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 1801, at *43-45 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2002), rev'd, 100 S.W.3d
809 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Ellis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
private plaintiff in Overcastmistakenly submitted MAI 23.06(2), the verdict director for
public figures, when he should have submitted MAI 23.06(1). Id. at *43-44 (Ellis, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This required him to carry a greater burden at
trial and thus gave Billings Mutual no reason to object to the instruction he submitted.
Id. at *44 (Ellis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Ellis noted that
Billings Mutual did not raise the instruction error on appeal because it wanted to keep the
benefit of the heightened burden on the plaintiff. Id. at *44-45 (Ellis, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, the Overcast court never dealt with the issue
of falsity so it had no occasion to address the discrepancy. Id. at *45 (Ellis, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Ellis wrote, "Consequently, it is my view that the
Overcast Court neither intended, nor effected, the significant change in the law of
defamation that the majority finds." Id. (Ellis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). However, he did admit that the elements of defamation, as enumerated in
Overcast,had been cited with approval by the court of appeals in subsequent cases. Id.
(Ellis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Deckard v. O'Reilly Auto.,
Inc., 31 S.W.3d 6, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), overruled by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel
Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. 2003); Moore v. Credit Info. Corp. of Am., 673 F.2d 208
(8th Cir. 1982).
174. See supra note 63.
175. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
176. Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
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defamation per quod (at least in modem American common law) already
required proof of actual damage. But the court went further than its holding
suggests: eliminatingper se defamation arguably eliminated all the procedural
advantages granted by the ecclesiastical courts. Since the presumption of
spiritual damage itself flowed from the presumption that the plaintiff s reputation
was good-i.e. that he was honest, healthy, and able to work-Nazeri can be
read as eliminating the presumption of the plaintiff's good reputation. And since
good reputation is the sine qua non for the presumption of falsity, Nazeri should
also be read as eliminating the presumption of falsity. Put simply, Nazeri
eliminated the last remnants of ecclesiastical jurisprudence from American
defamation law by abandoning both the presumption of damage and the
presumption of falsity. Consequently, Carolyn Kenney should have to prove
both on retrial.
Eliminating the distinction between per se and per quod causes of action
also helps to focus the law of defamation on the interests it protects. Actions for
slander and libel are meant to vindicate one's reputation rather than one's
feelings or privacy; however, the traditional presumption of damage allowed a
businessman to sue in the ecclesiastical courts for accusations of fraud without
having to prove that anyone actually believed the accusations. Similarly, the
presumption of falsity allowed a respected but secretly diseased priest to recover
for accusations of syphilis even though the accusations were true (but impossible
to prove). In the former scenario, the law of defamation is bent to protect the
businessman's feelings, in the latter to protect the priest's privacy. But modem
courts have devised other causes of action to vindicate these rights.'
Eliminating the presumptions of damage and falsity shunts cases of bruised
feelings and invaded privacy into causes of action more amenable to the injuries
involved and protects the integrity of defamation law.
Laying to rest the revenants of ecclesiastical doctrine also aligns the law of
defamation more squarely with the actual malice requirement ofNew York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, granting greater protection to free speech and free press. In
cases following Sullivan, the Supreme Court has observed that the ecclesiastical
presumption of damage "invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than
to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false
fact."' 78 With similar concern, the Court has also noted that the common law
presumption of falsity must be replaced by "a constitutional requirement that the
plaintiff bear the burden of proving falsity" in order to "ensure that true speech

177. As the Kenney court noted, modem courts recognize actions for intentional
or negligent infliction of emotional distress to compensate victims of outrageous attacks
on their emotional well being. Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 813-14
(Mo. 2003) (en banc). Further, Missouri courts have recognized a privacy tort for public
disclosure of private facts. See Childs v. Williams, 825 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992).
178. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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on matters of public concern is not deterred."' Moreover, it is difficult to
understand how a public plaintiff could prove the defendant's knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, as demanded by Sullivan, without first
proving that the statement was indeed false. 8 '
It is also helpful to remember that the ecclesiastical courts sentenced the
guilty to penance where modem courts award monetary damages. The threat of
ten Hail Marys is much less likely to chill speech than the threat of a four
hundred thousand dollarjudgment. The higher stakes, the interest in protecting
free speech, and the First Amendment's prohibition against state established
religion all advocate for the elimination of any latent holdovers from
ecclesiastical law. The Nazeri court was wise to eliminate the presumption of
damage, and the Kenney court would have been wise to do the same for the
presumption of falsity. Its failure to do so merely delays the inexorable
conclusion that Nazeri'sholding eliminated the presumption of falsity as well as
the presumption of damage. Missouri courts should no longer recognize the
ecclesiastical presumption of falsity and should henceforth require all plaintiffs
to prove falsity before recovering for defamation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though the Missouri Supreme Court missed an opportunity in Kenney
v. Wal-Mart Stores,Inc., to require proof of falsity from all defamation plaintiffs,
the Missouri Approved Instructions on defamation should be changed to reflect
the court's previous holdings. All defamation cases, whether maintained by
public or private plaintiffs, against private or media defendants, should have the
following six elements: (1) publication, (2) of a defamatory statement, (3) that
identifies the plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with the requisite
degree of fault, and (6) that damages the plaintiff's reputation.'' If the plaintiff
is a public official or a public figure, or if the case involves speech on matters of
public concern, the fifth element should incorporate the actual malice standard
of Sullivan.'82 In all other cases, the plaintiff need only prove
that the defendant
8 3
was negligent with regard to the falsity of her statement.
These six elements, with only one variable for courts to determine, comport

179. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986).
180. Many courts have in fact interpreted Sullivan as requiring a plaintiff to prove
both falsity and fault. See supra notes 111-12.
181. These six elements are substantially similar to those enumerated by the
Missouri Supreme Court in Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co., 11 S.W.3d 62,
70 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
182. The plaintiff must prove either actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement
or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
183. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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with the decisions of both the Missouri Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court and reflect a common law of defamation free from ecclesiastical
presumptions and in keeping with the First Amendment. Although requiring
proof of falsity may contradict certain passages in the Missouri Constitution,
statutes, and court rules listing truth as an affirmative defense,' 84 shifting the
burden onto the plaintiff does not preclude a defense of truth; 8 if anything, it
makes a truth defense easier to win. Moreover, such language, however old or
deeply imbedded in state law, cannot trump the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The MAIs on defamation must be stripped of their remaining
ecclesiastical presumptions so that all plaintiffs bear the burden of proving falsity
alike.
J. ANDREW HIRTH

184. See supra notes 106-09.
185. Cushing et al., supra note 122, at 139. "[T]ruth was an affirmative defense
at common law because it negated a presumption of falsity. Under constitutional
analysis, however, truth is a defense, not an affirmative defense, because it negates the
element of falsity and not a presumption of falsity." Id.
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